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1 Introduction
There has been recent interest from policymakers and researchers in docu-
menting and understanding regional “resilience” (e.g., Liu et al., 2011, and
Weir et al., 2012). In this paper, my starting point is the idea that, in the
long run, changes in regional populations may reflect changes in the un-
derlying productive or amenity values of those locations. That is, whereas
a decline in population over a short period of time may signal responses
by households and firms to a temporary shock, a long-run decline strongly
suggests a persistent reduction in the relative attractiveness of that region.
Observed long-run changes in the distribution of population across regions,
then, can be informative about the changing value of regions over time and
a reasonable way to define the “resilience” of regions.
In Section 2, I discuss spatial equilibrium, a tool that urban economists
use to understand the uneven geographic distribution of population and eco-
nomic activity. In this framework, the distribution of population represents
a balance between valuable amenities (e.g., rivers, houses, or product vari-
ety) and congestion costs (e.g., traffic, crime, or high land prices). Over the
long run, changes in the relative population of regions may reflect changes
in this balance between amenity benefits and costs from crowding. Thus, by
examining long-term changes in the distribution of population across U.S.
regions, we can better understand the changing relative values of these re-
gions to households and firms. Put simply, if households and firms continue
to choose to live in a region over a long period of time, that suggests that
the value of regional amenities has remained resilient. In contrast, regions
that are unable to successfully transition from older, obsolete amenities to
newer, more valuable amenities will be more likely to suffer protracted, deep
declines in population. This reasoning is the basis for my definition of re-
gional resilience; I define resilient regions as those regions that manage to
avoid episodes of persistent declines in population.
But first, in Section 3, I review recent annual employment data for U.S.
metropolitan areas from 1991–2010. Conditional on using a population or
employment data series to infer something about the resilience of regions,
this exercise is useful for illustrating the weaknesses of an approach that
relies on high-frequency changes versus a long-run approach. Notably, over
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the most recent two decades, seemingly dissimilar regions such as the Detroit
and San Francisco metropolitan areas exhibit similarly weak employment
dynamics. I conclude that idiosyncratic shocks and short time horizons
can make it difficult to draw inferences about any underlying changes in the
relative value of locations. Instead, I suggest that a much longer time horizon
and an emphasis on persistent declines would form a better approach.
I describe an approach that emphasizes long-run changes in population
in section 4. First, I choose to examine U.S. metropolitan areas, which are
groups of counties that share common labor, housing, and local product
markets. Second, I collect county population data from every decennial
census from 1790 to 2010. Third, because county boundaries change over
time, I normalize these data to 2010 county boundaries. Fourth, I aggregate
these data to regions based on the 2009 metropolitan and micropolitan area
definitions used by the census. Finally, I calculate standardized population
growth for each region and decade, relative to the average U.S. region’s
growth in that period.
Using maps, I show that steep, persistent declines in population are rel-
atively rare among regions in U.S. history, but these episodes have become
more common since the mid-20th century. I define “persistent declines”
as two consecutive decades of regional population growth that is (much)
slower than the U.S. average. In section 5, using regressions, I show that
these episodes of persistent relative decline are more likely to be experienced
by regions that have (i) low population; (ii) low levels of industrial diver-
sity; (iii) low levels of education; and (iv) high employment shares in traded
industries. In addition, using census division indicators to control for fixed
factors like geography and climate, I find that the Mountain and Pacific
regions have been the most resilient in recent decades, while regions near
the Great Lakes and the Middle Atlantic states have been the least resilient.
Thus, historically, resilient regions—those that have avoided persistent rela-
tive declines in population—have been more populated, industrially diverse,
highly educated, and service-based and have had access to natural amenities
similar to those available in the western U.S. Finally, in section 6, I use these
historical patterns to construct a resilience index based on contemporary re-
gional characteristics.
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2 Regional resilience and spatial equilibrium
A starting point for thinking about resilience is spatial equilibrium—a cen-
tral way in which urban economists understand the geographic distribution
of economic activity. In short, economists believe that, in the long run,
people choose to live and work in places that have productive or amenity
value. (This value may stem from a natural resource, such as a river; local
institutions, such as well-defined property rights; or economies of density,
such as those that make available the greater variety of goods and services
in large cities. See Lin, 2012, for more discussion.) High-value places offer
greater benefits; in exchange, people are willing to pay more for local goods,
such as housing. Thus, economists tend to view the uneven geographic dis-
tribution of economic activity, at least in the long run, as a consequence of
the balancing of two opposing forces: valuable amenities that attract firms
and households to certain places versus the higher housing costs and other
disamenities that result from increased crowding.
Similarly, we can understand changes over time in the geographic dis-
tribution of population. It follows that regions or cities that have grown
in population relative to other cities have similarly increased in their rela-
tive productive or amenity value. In contrast, places that have experienced
extended periods of relative decline in population seem likely to have also
declined in the relative value that they offer residents and businesses. Over
the long run, economists expect that changes in the relative population
of regions reflect changes in the underlying balance of benefits from local
amenities versus costs from increased crowding.
Of course, this is not to say that, for places that have maintained
their relative level of economic activity, the sources of their productive or
amenity value have remained unchanged. Over long stretches of history,
given changes in technology and preferences and the depreciation of capital,
it is unreasonable to expect that initial valuable factors, such as a harbor,
continue to provide the same value. Rather, given a place with a constant or
growing population, we expect that this place has successfully transitioned
from its “first-nature” advantages (e.g., a harbor) to other, more modern
advantages (e.g., a robust financial sector, highways and railroads, or skilled
workers). (See Bleakley and Lin, 2012, for evidence of portage cities that
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have successfully made this transition.) Put simply, if we observe that house-
holds and firms have continued to choose a region over a long period of time,
that suggests that the value of regional amenities has remained resilient. In
contrast, regions that are unable to successfully transition from older, obso-
lete amenities to newer, more valuable amenities will be more likely to suffer
protracted, deep declines in population. This reasoning is the basis for my
definition of regional resilience, which is explored further in Section 4.
A key consideration is the long run versus the short run. We expect
that, in the short run, all regions are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, some
of them negative. In observing these regions over a short time horizon, we
will necessarily be uncertain about the sources of population movements.
Is a yearly population decline related to changes in the underlying balance
of local benefits and costs? Or is that decline because of a bad shock, say,
storm damage or a business cycle trough, that will soon dissipate? Thus,
while spatial equilibrium may be a useful tool in understanding the long-run
geographic distribution of activities, it is less useful for describing differences
across regions in the short run.
3 Using short-run employment changes to mea-
sure resilience
In this section, I review annual employment data for U.S. metropolitan
areas from 1991–2010. Conditional on using a data series on population
or employment to try to infer the underlying value of regions, this exercise
is useful for illustrating the weaknesses of an approach that relies on high-
frequency changes versus a long-run approach.
I collect employment and income data from the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages for 87 of the largest metropolitan areas in the U.S.
over 1991–2010, on an annual basis. Figure 1 shows the logarithm of an-
nual changes in employment for eight of these metropolitan areas. Panel A
groups four slow-growing metropolitan areas: the San Francisco Bay Area,
Detroit, Philadelphia, and Tampa. On average, over this period these four
metropolitan areas experienced annual employment growth of 0.2%, which
lagged the U.S. metropolitan average of 1.1%. In contrast, Panel B shows
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employment growth in some of the fastest-growing metropolitan areas in this
period; annual employment growth among Houston, McAllen, Las Vegas,
and Sacramento over this period averaged 2.6%. (Personal income growth
was also slower in the four metropolitan areas in Panel A, at 4.3%, versus
the U.S. average of 4.9% and the growth rate for the four metropolitan areas
in Panel B, at 6.7%.)
These graphs demonstrate several peculiarities. A classification of metro-
politan areas based on annual employment growth would tend to group to-
gether several seemingly dissimilar metropolitan areas into a “non-resilient”
class. For example, San Francisco and Detroit are very different in terms of
industrial structure, education, and amenities, yet display similar employ-
ment dynamics over the last twenty years. In contrast, the fastest-growing
cities were those that experienced the housing boom most acutely, especially
in the southwestern U.S.
A likely explanation for these peculiarities lies in the series of idiosyn-
cratic shocks experienced over the past two decades: the housing boom in
certain parts of the country, the dot-com boom and bust, and the continued
stagnation of manufacturing employment meant that the slowest-growing
metropolitan areas were high-technology coastal California metros and older,
industrial cities in the Midwest and Northeast. Fast-growing metros tended
to be in the South and interior West and often featured relatively low hous-
ing costs and low education levels.
However, note the difficulty in inferring from these correlations—between
employment growth and characteristics such as industry mix, education,
housing, and geography—an important causal link. First, patterns of em-
ployment growth over a short span of time may reflect the character of
economic shocks, rather than the effect of regional factors on growth. Con-
sider the following example. New Orleans experienced negative employment
growth between 2005–2006. While that information might point to New
Orleans’ poor “resilience,” a more cautious interpretation would point out
that Hurricane Katrina and its effects were a very bad series of shocks. A
better approach might take into account (i) regional shocks may be of vary-
ing intensity and (ii) the adjustment periods of years, if not decades, that
households and firms need to fully respond to economic shocks.
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A second weakness of a methodology that relies on high-frequency changes
in population or employment is that many local factors—e.g., industry mix,
education, housing, and geography—are very persistent, meaning that they
change (if at all) very slowly. At any point in time, the geographic distri-
bution of these factors likely reflects decisions that were made years, if not
decades, before. In other words, annual variation in employment growth
adds very little information because potential explanatory variables often
do not change appreciably over two decades. Thus, even if there is some
variation in the short-term employment dynamics of the metropolitan areas
in Figure 1, Panel A, the fact that the average level of employment growth
is similar across these regions means that regression analysis will assign
common characteristics of these regions to low resilience.
4 Identifying episodes of persistent relative de-
cline in U.S. history
In this section, I describe a strategy for identifying resilient regions that
takes a longer-run perspective. Instead of annual data, as in the previous
section, I use decennial data, drawn from U.S. censuses from 1790–2010.
By using a long panel, I hope to reduce uncertainty about the information
contained in relative regional declines: over short time horizons, we cannot
be certain if a negative result reflects the characteristics of a particular shock
or characteristics of that region. A longer time horizon can reduce (though
not eliminate) this uncertainty. Further, examining long-run changes in
population can better account for long adjustment periods for households
and firms to fully respond to economic shocks.
I define a region as “resilient” if it has avoided an episode of persistent,
relative population decline over a long period of time. If we observe that a
region has grown in population relative to other regions, that suggests that
the value of regional amenities has remained resilient. In contrast, regions
that are unable to successfully transition from older, obsolete amenities to
newer, more valuable amenities will be more likely to suffer protracted, deep
declines in population.
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4.1 Data on historical population
I collect data on population for U.S. counties, for every decade from 1790 to
2010, from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS)
database (Minnesota Population Center, 2011). These population data are
in turn drawn from the decennial U.S. censuses of population. Thus, the
choice of ten-year intervals is determined both by the availability of the un-
derlying data, as well as a desire to focus on long-run changes in population.
Population data are the best and most consistent information available in
historical censuses; using population helps to maximize the sample size. Un-
fortunately, other types of data, such as employment, income, and industry
mix, are only available sporadically, mostly in recent censuses.
A second main reason for using these census data is the availability of
population information for small units of geography—in this case, counties—
over a long period of time.
Then, because county boundaries change over time, I normalize these
historical population counts to modern-day 2010 county boundaries. To
do so, I compare maps of historical counties and modern counties, from
NHGIS, to determine how boundaries have changed. Then, for historical
counties that change their boundaries, I apportion their population across
modern-day county boundaries according to land area. This results in panel
data on population for normalized counties, over 23 decennial census years.
I then aggregate counties to present-day (2009) metropolitan and mi-
cropolitan area definitions. For counties that lay outside metropolitan and
micropolitan areas, I group them by state remainders. Thus, for example,
the Philadelphia metropolitan area contains 11 counties in Delaware, New
Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, while Oklahoma counties that are not
part of any metropolitan or micropolitan area are assigned to a “rural Ok-
lahoma” remainder. I further limit my analysis to county groups and years
that have at least a population of 50,000, in order to exclude extremely
vast rural areas that do not necessarily represent common labor, housing,
or product markets. Thus, I reduce the number of geographic units from
3,109 normalized counties to 468 county groups representing metropolitan
areas, micropolitan areas, and more-populated rural regions. Note that
these county groups cover a significant portion of the geographic extent of
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the U.S., a much larger portion than is covered by standard metropolitan
area definitions.
There is one more sample restriction based on date of county entry into
the U.S., which I discuss later in this section.
For each region (group of counties) and year, I compute the logarithm
of population growth. Because overall U.S. population growth varies over
time, I do not necessarily want to compare, say, the population growth of
Chicago in the 1820s to the population growth of Las Vegas in the 1990s.
Further, our discussion of spatial equilibrium suggests that what we want
is to compare contemporaneous population trends across cities and regions.
For these reasons, I normalize population growth by year. Thus, for example,
I compare the population growth of Chicago in the 1820s to the population
growth of Philadelphia in the 1820s.
Figure 2 shows the raw data on relative population growth for 1820–
1830 and 1930–1940, at the county (not regional) level. Each county is
colored according to its relative population growth in that decade: Dark
green counties were the fastest-growing counties; light green counties grew
faster than the average county; orange counties grew slower than the average
county; and red counties were the slowest-growing counties.
The most obvious feature in comparing these two maps is that of the ex-
panding geographic footprint of the U.S. During the 1820s, large portions of
the present-day U.S. were still politically unorganized or yet to be annexed.
This can be seen in the large amount of missing data, shown as white space.
In addition, the fastest-growing counties in the 1820s were those on the fron-
tier, especially areas around the Great Lakes. In contrast, counties within
the original 13 colonies experienced relatively balanced population growth,
but at a rate slower than counties on the frontier.
By the 1930s, the entire present-day extent of the coterminous U.S. had
been organized. The clearest pattern reflected in the map in Panel B of Fig-
ure 2 is the depopulation of the Great Plains associated with the Dust Bowl.
This map also shows relatively slow growth in the Midwest compared with
faster population growth in Florida, California, and Texas—the beginnings
of larger migrations to the Sunbelt in subsequent decades.
Another feature evident in the maps is some degree of mean reversion
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in population growth. Some counties experience fast population growth,
only to experience at-pace or slow population growth in subsequent periods.
An example of this is Chicago; large population increases in the mid-19th
century, corresponding to its initial boom and the expansion of its railroad
network, had dissipated by the early 20th century. One repeated pattern is
that frontier areas tend to experience population booms in the initial decades
after their entry into the U.S. (This pattern is consistent with the findings of
Desmet and Rappaport, 2012, of population booms in “new” counties.) A
concern that is relevant for the present study is that these booms often take
a long time to dissipate after a county’s initial entry into the U.S. Because
they are caused by entry into the system of regions, rather than adjustment
among an existing group of regions, I exclude counties in the first 60 years
of existence from my sample.
4.2 Identifying persistent relative decline using regional pop-
ulation growth
Next, I return to data on regional (that is, county group) population growth.
Recall that there were at least two weaknesses in our initial analysis using an-
nual employment: uncertainty about the size and nature of regional shocks,
and uncertainty about the length of adjustment time required for house-
holds and firms to respond to these shocks. To address these weaknesses
using the data on regional population growth, I adopt a very simple filter: I
compare relative population growth for each region to population growth in
the subsequent decade. For example, I compare relative population growth
in Detroit from 1930–1940 to population growth in Detroit from 1940–1950.
Only if regional growth is below average in both time periods do I consider
the decline in the first period to be persistent.
More formally, define ∆Pg,t ≡ lnPg,t+1 − lnPg,t as the log change in
population for region g between census year t and t+ 1. If ∆Pg,t < µt + aσt
and ∆Pg,t+1 < µt+1 +aσt+1, where µt is average regional population growth
between t and t+ 1, σt is the standard deviation of population growth, and
a is some cutoff criteria, then I consider the decline in the first period t
to be persistent. I try several values for a, including 0, −0.5, and −1. If
a = 0, then the criterion is that growth is below average in two consecutive
10
decades. If a = −1, then the criterion is that growth is at least one standard
deviation below average in consecutive decades. Note that this methodology
requires two decades of data following the initial observation—so the last
possible year for which I can identify persistent regional declines is 1990.
Conversely, I define resilience as regions that avoid these episodes of
persistent decline. Thus, regions and years that do not experience two con-
secutive decades of below-average growth are assigned an indicator value of
1, and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows the share of regions by year that pass these
criteria, for three values of a: 0, −0.5, and −1. Thus, between 1930–1950,
54.5 percent of sample regions did not experience below-average growth in
the 1930s and 1940s and were thus resilient. Similarly, using the lower value
of a, 97.9 percent of regions between 1930–1950 did not experience growth
that was slower than one standard deviation below average in the subse-
quent two decades. Note that, for a = 1, no region was non-resilient before
1920–1940.
4.3 Maps of persistent relative declines and increases in re-
gional population
The series of maps of U.S. regions in Figures 3, 4, and 5 show these data
on persistent regional growth. The maps show persistent relative increases
in population, in light and dark green, in addition to persistent relative
declines, in orange and red. (Note that these maps show data for all regions,
including “new” regions and very rural regions that are later excluded from
my analysis.)
In the maps, regions are colored yellow when they show moderate in-
creases or decreases in population in two consecrative decades. More ex-
treme increases or decreases (at least one-half of a standard deviation better
or worse than average, in two consecutive decades) are shown in light green
and orange, respectively.
These maps show that, for the first 140 years of U.S. history, persistent
changes in relative population were rare and confined mostly to episodes
of frontier booms. For example, Chicago from 1800–1830 experienced per-
sistently faster population growth than the rest of the U.S., followed by
Minneapolis from 1820–1840. Booms followed in Oklahoma in the late 19th
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century and in Los Angeles and southern Florida starting around 1900. Dur-
ing this period, the U.S. overall experienced rapid population growth across
nearly all regions, but most especially on the frontier. Even short, devastat-
ing losses across the U.S. South during the Civil War were reversed in the
1870s. Thus, these areas are largely colored yellow on the maps.
In fact, it is not until the Dust Bowl in rural 1930s Oklahoma that we see
any large U.S. region experiencing persistently slow growth. This episode
of persistently sluggish growth is followed by areas of the rural South in the
mid-20th century, such as the Mississippi Delta, that experienced substantial
African-American outmigration to northern cities.
In the late 20th century, the maps show continued relative declines in the
rural Great Plains and the rural South. Starting in 1960, the maps show
persistent declines in isolated, older industrial cities—such as Johnstown,
Pennsylvania from 1960–1980; Youngstown, Ohio, starting around 1970;
and western Pennsylvania and western New York state starting in 1990.
Table 2 lists regions, identified by their principal city and state, and
years that have experienced two consecutive decades of growth slower than
one standard deviation below average since 1930.
Importantly, while steep, persistent relative declines are rare in U.S.
history, they seem to reflect actual changes in the productive or amenity
value of certain regions and cities. During the Dust Bowl, there is evidence
that rural areas of Oklahoma experienced real and persistent declines in the
agricultural productivity of the soil. (Often, the productive layer of topsoil
literally disappeared; for example, see Hornbeck, 2012, for evidence.) This
correlation between persistent population declines and permanent declines
in the amenity value of regions suggests that our method of identifying
resilient regions is at least somewhat successful at differentiating the effects
of idiosyncratic shocks on population from the effects of changes in the
overall amenity value of regions.
In sum, persistent population changes among U.S. regions over 220 years
are somewhat rare, but they have been more common in recent decades. An
algorithm that is based on persistent changes in regional population seems to
accurately classify regions in U.S. history that have experienced prolonged
“busts”—that is, regions that have declined in amenity or productive value
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in one decade and have been unable to return to average or above-average
growth in the subsequent decade. The episodes of persistent decline identi-
fied in Figures 3, 4, and 5 seem to identify non-resilient regions.
5 Predicting persistent relative declines in U.S.
history using historical factors
Next, I examine several historical factors that predict episodes of persistent
decline in U.S. history. Although data availability varies by year, many
historical censuses have information on factors that may predict regional
resilience. In general, urban economic theory suggests that factors that
are immobile, durable, or associated with strong positive spillovers may be
associated with the resilience of regional amenities.
My strategy in this section is to regress an indicator of regional resilience
on several historical factors. As in the previous section, I define the resilience
indicator to be 1 for regions and years that do not experience two consecutive
decades of below-average growth. I experiment with several thresholds for
“below-average growth,” using one and one-half standard deviation slower
than the average county. However, for the initial presentation, I focus on all
regions that experienced two consecutive decades of below-average growth
as an indicator of non-resilience. As the dependent variable is a binary
outcome, I use a probit model, which restricts predicted values to be between
0 and 1. Based on data availability, I include several historical factors as
explanatory variables in the probit regression model.
In particular, one factor that may be associated with positive spillovers
and is available in every decade is population density. Urban economists
have long postulated the existence of economies of density, or increasing
returns to the geographic concentration of economic activity. In the analysis
that follows, I include the logarithm of population and the logarithm of land
area.
Economists have also noted the role of human capital in economies of
density, through knowledge spillovers or demand linkages. We include mea-
sures of metropolitan area educational attainment—the shares of the pop-
ulation over 25 years of age that have completed at least some college in
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modern censuses, or the share of the adult population that is literate in
certain historical 19th century censuses.
I also control for the nine census divisions, to control for persistent nat-
ural amenities such as climate and geography.
When available, I compute employment shares for sectors that may be
associated with large fixed factors or associated with some economies of
density—for brevity, I call these “traded sectors,” and they include manufac-
turing, information, finance, wholesale trade, and medical and educational
services. Finally, Jacobs (1969) hypothesized that industrial diversity was
related to the production and adaptation of new ideas. I also calculate a
measure of industrial diversity—an inverted Herfindahl-Hirschman index—
constructed by summing the squared industry employment shares for each
region and year.
5.1 Regression results
Table 3 displays results from four probit regressions of the resilience indica-
tor on historical factors. The dependent resilience variable takes a value of
1 if a region did not experience two decades of below-average growth. Each
column shows estimated marginal effects from a separate probit regression.
Thus, from column (1), all else equal, a 10% increase in population is asso-
ciated with a 1.27% increase in resilience, for the average county.
Column (1) includes only population density, that is, the logarithm of
population and land area, as regressors, and thus uses all of the available
data. Column (2) includes a measure of the region’s educational attainment,
and therefore narrows the sample to more modern censuses.
Greater population predicts resilience. This result is robust to the in-
clusion of census division and year indicators, as well as to other covariates,
as seen in later columns. These marginal effect estimates suggest that, for
the average county, a 10 percent increase in population, holding area fixed,
predicts an 0.8–1.3 percent increase in resilience.
Regions with educated populations also tend to be more resilient. Fol-
lowing the estimates reported in columns (3) and (5), for the average county,
a 5-percentage-point increase (approximately 1 standard deviation among
1990 regions) in the college graduate share is associated with a 3–5 percent
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increase in resilience.
Industrial diversity, as measured by an inverted Herfindahl-Hirschman
index using industry employment shares, is also related to resilience. Ac-
cording to the estimated marginal effects in columns (4) and (5), a one-
standard-deviation increase in industrial diversity predicts a 3–4 percent
increase in resilience for the average county.
Finally, greater employment shares in “traded” industries predict less re-
silience. While these industries tend to be associated with large fixed factors
or strong economies of density, suggesting that they may aid resilience, these
industry features can also predict reversals, where agglomerations disperse
and re-form somewhere else.
The pattern of the results is mostly unchanged if we use alternative defi-
nitions of resilience based on the one-half or one-standard-deviation thresh-
olds. Table 4 displays regression results using these alternative resilience
measures as the dependent variable. (These estimates are also robust to
alternative estimation strategies. Results using a linear probability model
are qualitatively similar to the reported probit results.)
6 Building a resilience index using historical pat-
terns
In this section, I use the historical correlations among regional factors and
resilience shown in Table 3 to construct a ranking of 2010 regions. I cal-
culate the predicted values for each U.S. region based on 2010 values of
population density, industry mix, and education and the regression coef-
ficients estimated in Table 3, column (5). In effect, I am assuming that
historical correlations among these regional factors and resilience are infor-
mative about the future resilience of regions. By construction of the probit
estimator, these predicted values are between 0 and 1. The result of this
procedure is that I form an out-of-sample prediction for the resilience of
each U.S. region based on 2010 regional data.
Figure 6 shows a map of U.S. regions. Each point represents a U.S.
region according to the longitude and latitude of its principal city and is
colored according to its predicted value of resilience. Several things are
15
notable about this map. First, nearly half of all U.S. regions have resilience
scores above 0.75, and three-quarters of the regions have resilience scores
above 0.50. This reflects a historical pattern in that very few regions in the
past have experienced persistent relative declines in population.
Second, the largest regions by population are labeled on the map. In
general, all of these cities have high predicted resilience. This pattern re-
flects the positive association between past resilience and population density.
Notably, several large cities that have experienced recent episodes of persis-
tent decline—e.g., Pittsburgh and Detroit—have predicted resilience values
in 2010 much greater than those in 1980 and 1990. In fact, looking at
only predicted values based on the probit regression, Pittsburgh’s predicted
resilience has risen to 0.51 in 2010, from 0.24 in 1970.
Table 5 lists predicted resilience values for the largest 2010 regions by
population, as well as confidence intervals based on the standard errors of
the predicted values. All of these regions are large metropolitan areas with
populations of at least 1 million in 2010. Note that nearly all of them
have predicted resilience scores very close to 1, and almost all of them have
confidence intervals for the predictions that include 1. Only a handful of
the largest metropolitan areas have poor predicted resilience scores.
Regions with poor predicted resilience tend to be smaller and located
near the Great Lakes or in the Great Plains. Again, refer to the map in
Figure 6. This pattern corresponds to findings from the probit regression; in
recent decades, regions in these areas have been the most likely to experience
continued declines in population. While we cannot be certain as to the cause
of these declines, one hypothesis is that it is probably related in part to
changes in preferences and technology that have led to greater migration
flows from the Northeast and Midwest to the West and South. Thus, our
regression model predicts greater resilience for those regions in the West and
South and less resilience for regions in the Midwest.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I describe a method for constructing a “regional resilience
index.” I define resilient regions as those that avoid persistent declines for
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population—growth that lags the U.S. average in two consecutive decades. I
use population data on U.S. regions—metropolitan, micropolitan, and rural
areas—over 220 years. These episodes of persistent decline are relatively
rare in U.S. history but are more common since the mid-20th century. Using
probit regressions and data on historical regional factors, I find that U.S.
regions that are densely populated, highly educated, industrially diverse,
and service-based are more likely to be resilient. Then, using estimates
from the probit regressions, I compute predicted values of resilience for U.S.
regions using information on regional factors from the 2010 census.
So far, I have intentionally said very little about welfare and the policy
implications of this work. In part this is because the welfare implications of
persistent regional decline are not clear. If the productive or amenity value
of a region declines, households and firms may leave this region and move
to other regions. But to the extent that the absolute productive or amenity
value of other regions improves, households and firms may not be worse
off and, under certain conditions, may even be better off. If policymakers
care about the welfare of households, rather than the welfare of places and
landowners, these long-run population dynamics may not be very meaningful
for policy.
My analysis has also isolated particular regional factors—population
density, industry mix, and education—that explain resilience but are slow to
evolve over time and are relatively insensitive to policy. In fact, variation in
these factors across regions often has roots decades or even centuries in the
past. In addition, the short-run elasticities appear relatively small, meaning
that large differences in these factors are associated with small differences
in resilience. There are also factors such as geography and climate that are
outside the reach of local policymakers. Finally, the relationships between
historical factors and resilience that I use to predict resilience scores in Sec-
tion 6 are not causal estimates. Instead, they reflect correlations in the data
that may change in the wake of changes in technology, preferences, or other
shifts in the economy.
This is not to say that the long-term effects of local amenities are always
negligible. Bleakley and Lin (2012) show examples of small differences in
initial value across regions that have large effects on population density and
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income, a century or more after the sources of initial value became obsolete.
Rather, the results that I have presented here can form a historical frame-
work in which to better understand why regions that have superior factors
are able to avoid persistent declines in population and value. For example,
in Lin (2011), I show that regions that have educated populations are better
able to adapt to new technologies. Carlino and Saiz (2008) similarly show
that regions with greater consumption amenities are able to attract and
retain educated workers. Taken together, these results suggest that local
amenities may potentially have significant long-run effects.
In sum, the predicted resilience scores reflect historical relationships be-
tween regional factors and long-term, persistent relative declines in popula-
tion. These regional factors do well in explaining past episodes of regional
decline in U.S. history. The predictive ability of these scores therefore re-
lies in part on stable relationships among these variables and may be more
fragile in the event of significant changes to preferences or technologies. Fi-
nally, while persistent regional declines may induce costly adjustments for
households and firms in the short run, the long-run welfare implications are
less clear.
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Figure 1: Metropolitan area employment growth, 1991–2010
The four metropolitan areas in Panel A experienced annual employment growth that was slower
(0.2%) than the U.S. metropolitan area average (1.1%) over the period 1991-2010. The four
metropolitan areas in Panel B experienced annual employment growth of 2.6% over this period.
Source data are from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. Personal income growth
was slower in the four metropolitan areas in Panel A (4.3%) versus the U.S. average (4.9%) and




Figure 2: Population growth in U.S. counties, 1820–1830 and 1930–1940
This map shows population growth in U.S. counties (normalized to 2010 boundaries) in two
decades, 1820–1830 (Panel A) and 1930–1940 (Panel B). Each county is colored according to its
relative growth in that decade. Dark green counties were the fastest-growing counties (growth
was greater than one standard deviation above average); light green counties grew faster than
the average county; orange counties grew slower than the average county; and red counties were
the slowest-growing counties (growth was slower than one standard deviation below average).
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Figure 6: Predicted resilience for 2010 regions
Notes: This figure shows resilience scores for U.S. regions based on 2010 regional data on popu-
lation density, industry mix, and education. Scores are predicted values based on estimates from
regression (4) in Table 3. By construction of the probit model, scores are between 0 and 1.
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Table 1: Resilient regions by year and resilience measure
Resilience measure
Period Total Regions a = 0 a = −0.5 a = −1
1920–1940 302 0.513 0.954 0.993
1930–1950 330 0.545 0.906 0.979
1940–1960 348 0.552 0.805 0.948
1950–1970 372 0.642 0.844 0.965
1960–1980 413 0.646 0.884 0.973
1970–1990 424 0.535 0.797 0.972
1980–2000 466 0.564 0.783 0.961
1990–2010 468 0.568 0.780 0.953
This table shows the number and share of regions I classify as “resilient,” based on population
growth over the two decades indicated in the first column. The second column shows the number of
regions with valid data in each period. The sample is an unbalanced panel of consistent-boundary
U.S. regions (groups of 2010-boundary counties representing metropolitan, micropolitan, or rural
areas), with a population of at least 50,000 in the initial year, whose date of entry is no less than
sixty years before the initial year. The sample expands as more regions become more populated
over time. Each cell shows the proportion of regions that satisfy resilience criteria as noted in
the column headings. “Not below average” (a = 0) indicates that a region has not experienced
two consecutive decades of below-average population growth, beginning in the initial year. “Not
0.5 s.d. below average” (a = −0.5) indicates that a region has not experienced two consecutive
decades of population growth slower than 0.5 standard deviation below average, beginning in the
year noted in the row heading. “Not 1 s.d. below average” (a = −1) indicates that a region has
not experienced two consecutive decades of population growth slower than 1 standard deviation
below average, beginning in the year noted in the row heading.
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Table 2: Non-resilient regions with two decades of slow population growth
Twenty-year period ending in:
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Beckley, WV X
Bluefield, WV X




Cleveland, MS X X
Clinton, IA X
Corsicana, TX X X
Danville, IL X X
Decatur, IL X X
Elmira, NY X
Fort Madison, IA X
Galesburg, IL X X
Greenville, MS X
Greenwood, MS X X X X
Hope, AR X
Houghton, MI X X X X
Indianola, MS X
Jamestown, NY X
Johnstown, PA X X X X
Marion, IN X X X
Mason City, IA X
Morgan City, LA X
Natchez, MS X X





Pottsville, PA X X X
Richmond, IN X




Rural IA X X




Rural ND X X X X X X X
Rural NE X X X X X X X
Rural NM X X
Rural OK X X
Rural SD X X
Rural TX X X
Rural WV X X
Saginaw, MI X
Scranton, PA X
Selma, AL X X
Steubenville, OH X X X
Wheeling, WV X X
Youngstown, OH X
This table shows all regions in my sample that have experienced episodes of slow growth in U.S.
history. The sample is an unbalanced panel of consistent-boundary U.S. regions (groups of 2010-
boundary counties representing metropolitan, micropolitan, or rural areas), with a population of
at least 50,000 in the initial year, whose date of entry is no less than sixty years before the initial
year. These regions at some point have experienced two consecutive decades of population growth
slower than 1 standard deviation below average. These periods are marked by X, indicating the
twenty-year period ending in the year noted in each column heading. There were no regions that
satisfied these criteria prior to 1910–1930. Regions are named for their principal city and state.
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Table 3: Probit regression of regional resilience on historical factors
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log population 12.2 0.127 0.136 0.082 0.088
(1.12) (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.021)** (0.023)**
Log land area 22.5 -0.111 -0.124 -0.066 -0.075
(1.12) (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.024) ** (0.027)**
Share population educated 0.14 0.598 1.089
(0.05) (0.180)** (0.368)**
Industrial diversity 7.92 0.033 0.023
(1.14) (0.014)* (0.014)†
Employment share in 0.74 -0.602
traded industries (0.07) (0.305)*
Census division indicators X X X X
Census year indicators X X X X
Number of observations 4,183 3,351 1,358 1,358
Number of regions 489 488 476 476
Psuedo-R2 0.222 0.180 0.221 0.231
Each column in this table reports estimated marginal effects of the row variables from a sepa-
rate probit regression. Dependent variable is an indicator for regional resilience, with a value
of zero if the region has two consecutive decades of below-average population growth and one
otherwise. Standard errors, clustered on region, are in parentheses. **–Significant at the 99%
level of confidence; *–95%; †–90%. The sample is an unbalanced panel of consistent-boundary
U.S. regions (groups of 2010-boundary counties representing metropolitan, micropolitan, or rural
areas), with a population of at least 50,000 in the initial year, whose date of entry is no less than
sixty years before the initial year. Sample sizes are smaller in some regressions due to the limited
availability of data on the additional regressors. Each regression includes indicators for census
divisions and census years. Population share educated is the share of the adult population with
a college degree. In some historical censuses, this variable is the share of the adult population
that is literate. Industrial diversity is measured as the inverse of a Herfindahl-Hirschman index
of industry employment. Traded industries are defined as manufacturing, information, finance,
trade, and educational and medical services. Column (0) reports means and standard deviations
of variables for 1990 regions.
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Table 4: Probit regressions, alternative resilience measures
Resilience measure
a = 0 a = −0.5 a = −1
(0) (1) (2)
Log population 0.088 0.037 0.010
(0.023)** (0.022)† (0.012)
Log land area -0.075 -0.006 0.003
(0.027)** (0.024) (0.012)
Population share educated 1.089 1.882 0.445
(0.368)** (0.369)** (0.228)*
Industrial diversity 0.023 0.029 0.010
(0.014)† (0.013)* (0.007)
Employment share in -0.602 -0.036 0.399
traded industries (0.305)* (0.281) (0.136)**
Psuedo-R2 0.231 0.183 0.126
Notes: Each column reports marginal effects of the row variables from a separate probit regres-
sion. Dependent variable is an indicator for regional resilience, as noted in the column headings.
Standard errors, clustered on region, are in parentheses. **–Significant at the 99% level of confi-
dence; *–95%; †–90%. Column (0) repeats estimates from Table 3. “Not below average” (a = 0)
indicates that a region has not experienced two consecutive decades of below-average population
growth, beginning in the initial year. “Not 0.5 s.d. below average” (a = −0.5) indicates that a
region has not experienced two consecutive decades of population growth slower than 0.5 standard
deviation below average, beginning in the year noted in the row heading. “Not 1 s.d. below aver-
age” (a = −1) indicates that a region has not experienced two consecutive decades of population
growth slower than 1 standard deviation below average, beginning in the year noted in the row
heading. See notes from Table 3 for more details.
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Table 5: Predicted resilience index for largest 2010 regions
Metropolitan area name Resilience C.I.
San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, CA Combined Statistical Area 0.999 0.608 1.000
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.998 0.632 1.000
Denver-Aurora-Boulder, CO Combined Statistical Area 0.998 0.637 1.000
Seattle-Tacoma-Olympia, WA Combined Statistical Area 0.995 0.665 1.000
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Riverside, CA Combined Statistical Area 0.995 0.663 1.000
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.994 0.681 1.000
Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Yuba City, CA-NV Combined Statistical Area 0.993 0.677 1.000
Washington-Baltimore-Northern Virginia, DC-MD-VA-WV Combined Statistical Area 0.991 0.633 1.000
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.991 0.659 1.000
Salt Lake City-Ogden-Clearfield, UT Combined Statistical Area 0.988 0.702 1.000
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.984 0.669 1.000
Fresno-Madera, CA Combined Statistical Area 0.975 0.667 1.000
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.973 0.680 1.000
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.971 0.678 1.000
Raleigh-Durham-Cary, NC Combined Statistical Area 0.970 0.690 1.000
Las Vegas-Paradise-Pahrump, NV Combined Statistical Area 0.964 0.645 1.000
Orlando-Deltona-Daytona Beach, FL Combined Statistical Area 0.959 0.684 1.000
Jacksonville, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.949 0.695 1.000
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Gainesville, GA-AL Combined Statistical Area 0.947 0.696 1.000
Boston-Worcester-Manchester, MA-RI-NH Combined Statistical Area 0.941 0.580 1.000
Charlotte-Gastonia-Salisbury, NC-SC Combined Statistical Area 0.925 0.691 1.000
Austin-Round Rock-Marble Falls, TX Combined Statistical Area 0.923 0.630 1.000
Richmond, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.914 0.682 1.000
Hartford-West Hartford-Willimantic, CT Combined Statistical Area 0.912 0.573 1.000
Houston-Baytown-Huntsville, TX Combined Statistical Area 0.911 0.613 1.000
Greensboro–Winston-Salem–High Point, NC Combined Statistical Area 0.911 0.683 1.000
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX Combined Statistical Area 0.906 0.628 1.000
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC Combined Statistical Area 0.897 0.678 1.000
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.893 0.618 1.000
New Orleans-Metairie-Bogalusa, LA Combined Statistical Area 0.875 0.598 1.000
Oklahoma City-Shawnee, OK Combined Statistical Area 0.871 0.600 1.000
Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Columbia, TN Combined Statistical Area 0.832 0.552 1.000
Minneapolis-St. Paul-St. Cloud, MN-WI Combined Statistical Area 0.832 0.535 1.000
New York-Newark-Bridgeport, NY-NJ-CT-PA Combined Statistical Area 0.821 0.427 1.000
Memphis, TN-MS-AR Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.812 0.530 1.000
Louisville/Jefferson County–Elizabethtown–Scottsburg, KY-IN Combined Statistical Area 0.810 0.531 1.000
Birmingham-Hoover-Cullman, AL Combined Statistical Area 0.801 0.525 1.000
Knoxville-Sevierville-La Follette, TN Combined Statistical Area 0.792 0.508 1.000
Milwaukee-Racine-Waukesha, WI Combined Statistical Area 0.745 0.412 1.000
Kansas City-Overland Park-Kansas City, MO-KS Combined Statistical Area 0.744 0.471 1.000
St. Louis-St. Charles-Farmington, MO-IL Combined Statistical Area 0.742 0.455 1.000
Philadelphia-Camden-Vineland, PA-NJ-DE-MD Combined Statistical Area 0.715 0.363 1.000
Chicago-Naperville-Michigan City, IL-IN-WI Combined Statistical Area 0.711 0.379 1.000
Detroit-Warren-Flint, MI Combined Statistical Area 0.670 0.355 0.985
Cleveland-Akron-Elyria, OH Combined Statistical Area 0.659 0.346 0.972
Indianapolis-Anderson-Columbus, IN Combined Statistical Area 0.553 0.264 0.841
Columbus-Marion-Chillicothe, OH Combined Statistical Area 0.522 0.239 0.806
Cincinnati-Middletown-Wilmington, OH-KY-IN Combined Statistical Area 0.517 0.229 0.805
Pittsburgh-New Castle, PA Combined Statistical Area 0.509 0.207 0.810
Buffalo-Niagara-Cattaraugus, NY Combined Statistical Area 0.506 0.204 0.808
Albany-Schenectady-Amsterdam, NY Combined Statistical Area 0.496 0.189 0.803
Dayton-Springfield-Greenville, OH Combined Statistical Area 0.485 0.199 0.770
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI Combined Statistical Area 0.483 0.199 0.768
Rochester-Batavia-Seneca Falls, NY Combined Statistical Area 0.480 0.188 0.772
Notes: This table shows predicted resilience indexes for the largest U.S. regions by population,
which are all metropolitan areas, based on 2010 regional data on population density, industry
mix, and education. Resilience indexes for smaller U.S. regions are not shown in this table.
Predicted values based on estimates from regression (4) in Table 3. By construction of the probit
model, scores are between 0 and 1. The second and third columns show the lower and upper 67%
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